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Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)a, (5) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUB 
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the following issue: 
Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in its 
analysis and/or application of the Fourth Amendment standards 
governing the apparent authority of a person to consent to a search of 
another's property. 
Order, dated 27 July 2010 (a copy is attached in Addendum C). 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court 
of appeals for correctness. See State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. "The 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately 
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review/' Id. 
The court of appeals reviews a trial court's legal conclusions non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. It reviews the trial court's underlying factual 
findings for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,111,100 P.3d 1222. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a traffic stop that resulted in her arrest, Defendant was charged 
with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008-
2009); possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2) (b) (West 2004); false 
information to a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-8-507(2) (West 2004); and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5, 58-37-8(4)(c) 
2 
(West 2004). R2-1. Defendant, a passenger in the stopped vehicle, moved to 
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the driver's consent to search the SUV in 
which they had been traveling. R39-35. The trial court denied the motion. R77-69 
(a copy is attached in Addendum A). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to 
felony drug and weapon charges; the misdemeanor charges were dismissed. R95-
87; see also R98-97 and Rl05-04. The trial court imposed statutory prison terms of 
one to fifteen years for the second degree felony and zerp to five years for the third 
degree felony. R103. Those sentences were suspended and Defendant was placed 
on supervised probation for 36 months. R101. 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and ^ majority of the court of 
appeals affirmed. R106; State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, 223 P.3d 1148 (a copy is 
attached in Addendum B). This Court granted Defendant's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. See Addendum C. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
The trial court entered the following findings: 
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic 
stop on a vehicle for an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at 
approximately 9:30 p.m. 
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman 
discovered that the driver's license had been denied. 
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could 
drive the vehicle from the scene, Officer Westerman requested the 
names and dates of birth for each of the passengers and discovered that 
none of the passengers had a valid license. [2] 
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a 
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license. 
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the 
vehicle and told the driver she was free to leave. 
6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. 
At that point Officer Westerman requested permission to look in the 
vehicle and the driver gave consent. [3] 
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman 
asked the driver to search the vehicle, but was not involved in the 
search. 
1
 The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 
See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
2
 In total, there were four occupants, inlcuding the female driver and a male 
passenger in front, and another male passenger and Defendant in back. Rl 12:5-6. 
3
 Before the search, Officer Westerman asked the passengers to step out of the 
SUV and wait with the back-up officer, "if they wanted to/' "while [he] took a look 
in the vehicle." R112:15. 
4 
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the 
defendant's bags. They were located in a storage area directly behind 
the seat in which the defendant sat as a passenger in the vehicle. 
9. Before searching the bags, neither [Defendant] nor any of the [other] 
passengers indicated to whom the bags belonged. 
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine[,] and items identifying 
[Defendant] as the owner of the bags were found in the bags during the 
search. [4] 
11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested 
[Defendant] and during the search incident to arrest, Officer 
Westerman found a blade knife on [Defendant's] person. 
R76-75. The parties stipulated that the "initial traffic stop was legal," and that 
"defendant ha[d] standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." R75. 
Based on the above, the trial court concluded, among other things, that Officer 
Westerman reasonably believed that the driver's consent tb search the SUV included 
bags stowed behind the backseat. See R72-70. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case turns on whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe 
that the driver's consent to search her SUV extended to bags in the rear storage area. 
The trial court ruled, and a majority of the court of appeals agreed, that the officer's 
4
 Additionally, Officer Westerman found two bags that held non-contraband 
items e.g., "electronic equipment and a keyboard." Rll2:16. 
5 
belief was reasonable where the bags, along with several loose items, were stowed 
in the rear cargo area of the SUV; there was nothing about the bags themselves that 
suggested they did not belong to the driver; and neither the driver nor her 
passengers volunteered where they had been or where they were going, or that the 
bags did not, in fact, belong to the driver. The majority opinion should be upheld. 
Absent any indication the bags belonged to someone other than the driver, the 
Fourth Amendment did not require Officer Westerman to investigate whether the 
bags, in fact, belonged to the driver before he could reasonably rely on the driver's 
consent to search them. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED FOURTH 
AMENDMENT STANDARDS GOVERNING THE APPARENT 
AUTHORITY OF A PERSON TO CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF 
ANOTHER'S PROPERTY. 
It is well established that a warrantless, but consensual, search is reasonable. 
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,250-252 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218,228 (1973). While consent is typically obtained from the person whose property 
officers seek to search, it may also be obtained from a third party who has common 
authority over the property, see Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103,106 (2006); United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974), or even from a third party whom officers 
6 
reasonably, but mistakenly, believe has authority to consent to search the property, 
see Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,188-89 (1990). The 
State does not claim that Defendant consented to the search of the bags at issue, or 
that the driver who did consent to the search had common authority over the bags. 
Rather, the State asserts only that Officer Westerman reasonably, if mistakenly, 
believed that the driver's authority to consent to search included not only the SUV, 
but the bags stored in the rear cargo area. Both the trial court and a majority of the 
court of appeals agreed that Officer Westerman's belief, though ultimately mistaken, 
was reasonable. See State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, f f 12-19, 223 P.3d 1148. 
On certioari, Defendant asks this Court to reverse the majority's affirmation of 
the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress drug and weapon evidence. 
Defendant asserts that the circumstances were ambigous and therefore Officer 
Westerman acted unreasonably in searching the bags without first asking to whom 
they belonged. See Pet. Br. at 22. This Court should affirm the majority opinion, 
however, because Defendant fails to show that the circumstances here called for 
further inquiry-before Officer Westerman could reasonably act on the driver's 
consent to search. 
7 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of apparent 
authority to consent to search in Rodriguez, 497 US. at 188-89; see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 8.3(g) (4th ed. 2004). "In Rodriguez, [officers] conducted a 
search, reasonably but erroneously believing that a third person had authority to 
consent to the search." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah App. 1991) 
(discussing Rodriguez). "[S]ince [officers] reasonably believed the third person had 
authority to consent to the search/' the Supreme Court held that "the search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Id. (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89). In other words, "[t]he doctrine of 
apparent authority validates a search if [officers] reasonably, but mistakenly, believe 
that a third party consenting to the search has the authority to do so." State v. 
Sawyer, 784 A.2d 1208, 1211 (N.H. 2001) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186). The 
Supreme Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment does not require that 
officers "always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
at 185. Indeed, officers often confront "'more or less ambiguous'" circumstances 
"'in the course of executing their duties'"; therefore, "'room must be allowed for 
some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, 
acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.'" Id. (quoting 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949)). 
8 
As with all law enforcement conduct implicating the Fourth Amendment, 
"[t]he standard for assessing apparent authority to consent is an objective one: to 
determine whether a police officer's belief was objectively reasonable, a court must 
examine whether 'the facts available to the officer at tjie moment . . . [would] 
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief thatthe consenting party had 
authority over the premises/" Sawyer, 784 A.2d at 1211 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
at 188 (quotations omitted)); accord State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, f 14,131 P.3d 
246. "If the surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonable person to doubt 
whether the third party had the requisite authority, then the officer must make 
further inquiry to ensure that the person giving consent has authority to do so." 
Sawyer, 784 A.2d at 1211. But again, "a reasonable mistake in determining a third 
party's authority to consent does not give rise to an unreasonable search." 4 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.3(g) (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Rodriguez, 
Schneckloth, Brinegar, and Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)). 
Here, it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe that the driver had 
authority to consent to the search of the bags in the SUV If or several reasons. First, 
the bags were located in the storage area behind the back seat, an area, not unlike a 
trunk, which is typically controlled by the owner/driver; second, there was nothing 
about the bags (like a label or identification tag) that suggested they did not, in fact, 
9 
belong to the driver; and finally, neither the driver nor the passengers stated that the 
bags belonged to anyone other than the driver. See Harding, 2010 UT App 8, ^ [18. 
This is not a case where the bags "clearly d[id] not belong to a consenting driver"; 
accordingly, there was no necessity for further inquiry. Id. (emphasis added). 
Indeed, given the generic nature of the bags, this case is distinguishable from 
cases involving an "an item with a label or tag indicating ownership, or a purse, 
when there is a male driver and female passenger." Id. (citing United States v. Welch, 
4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D. 
1991) (officer could not reasonably rely on driver/husband's consent to search 
defendant/wife's purse), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Akuba, 686 N.W.2d 406 
(S.D. 2004); People v. James, 645 N.E.2d 195,203-04 (111. 1994) (where car occupied by 
three women, officer should have ascertained which woman left purse on passenger 
seat before searching it pursuant to driver's consent). It is also distinguishable from 
cases where a passenger claims the bag prior to its being searched, State v. Soma, 627 
A.2d 1074, 1077 (N.J. 1993), or where the consenting driver volunteers that the 
suitcases in the trunk belong to the passenger, see United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 
386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, this is not a case where there was 
evidence that the bags belonged to someone other than the consenting driver. 
Indeed, there was nothing about the bags themselves that reasonably suggested 
10 
Officer Westerman could not rely on the driver's consent to search. Cf. Elder, 815 
P.2d at 1344-45 (holding officer could not reasonably Relieve Elder's sister had 
authority to consent to search where sister's husband had to kick in locked door of 
crawl space). 
Rather, where, as here, "the vehicle's contents are more anonymous," Officer 
Westerman reasonably believed "that the consenting driver/owner exercised 
control over the vehicle and the items contained therein." Harding, 2010 UT App 8, 
Tf 18. As recognized by the majority, it is not at all unusual to expect that a driver 
controls both the car and its contents, even when there are passengers present, 
absent some contrary indication. See Harding, 2010 UTApp 8, f 19 (recognizing on 
these facts, "[a]ny belief that the bags belonged to one of the passengers would 
necessarily be based on speculation"). Thus, other courts have held that officers 
reasonably, if mistakenly, believed that a third-party driver had authority to consent 
where "there was nothing [like an identification tag] to alert [officers] that both, 
none, or only one of the bags . . . belonged to [the driver]," State v. Maristany, 627 
A.2d 1066,1070 (N.J. 1993), or where the bag "was not of the type that, on its face, 
could not reasonably have been believed to belong to [the driver]," Sawyer, 784: 
A.2d at 1212-13; cf. United States v. Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025,1028, (8th Cir. 1998) 
(officer reasonably believed garment bag in trunk belonged to driver/defendant's 
11 
passenger/wife, who consented to the vehicle search, where officer did not see 
identification tag on bag). 
Another circumstance or "factor upon which courts have relied to find an 
officer's belief reasonable is a passenger's failure to object to the search." Sawyer, 
784 A.2d at 1211. Defendant did not at any time object to the search here. The State 
recognizes that this factor may carry less weight on this record, because it is unclear 
how much of the driver's conversation with Officer Westerman, if any, the 
passengers overheard, or how much of the search they observed. See Sawyer, 784 
A.2d at 1213 (recognizing passenger's failure to object lacked probative value where 
record unclear "as to whether [passenger] heard the request to search and [the 
driver's response] or whether he observed the search"). However, the most recent 
third-party consent case from the United States Supreme Court supports that a 
passenger's failure to object is relevant, "[s]o long as there is no evidence that 
[officers] have removed the potentially objecting" passenger from the vicinity "for 
the sake of avoiding a possible objection." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121. 
In Randolph, the United States Supreme Court held that officers unreasonably 
relied on a co-tenant's consent to search where the other co-tenant was present and 
objected. Id. at 122-23. However, the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that 
the Fourth Amendment did not require officers "to take affirmative steps to find a 
12 
potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already 
received." 547 U.S. at 122. Rather, "the potential objector nearby, but not invited to 
take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out." Id. at 121. 
To hold otherwise, the Supreme Court stressed, would undercut Matlock 
(common authority) and Rodriguez (apparent authority). Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122. 
Neither Matlock nor Rodriguez was present to object t<t> the third-party consent 
searches upheld in those cases, but neither were they "far away": Matlock was in a 
squad car nearby, and Rodriquez "was actually asleep in the apartment, and 
[officers] might have roused him with a knock on the door before they entered with 
only the consent of an apparent co-tenant." Id. Randolph thus supports that the fact 
Defendant was nearby and did not object to the instant search is relevant, whether 
or not she was aware the driver had given consent to search the SUV. 
In any event, the reasonableness of Officer Westerman's search here is not 
dependant on Defendant's failure to object to it. The circumstances still "were not 
so ambiguous as to require [Officer Westerman] to make [further] inquiry." Sawyer, 
784 A.2d at 1213. As shown, there was nothing about the bags' location in the rear 
cargo area of the SUV or their appearance that reasonably suggested they did not, in 
fact, belong to the driver. See id. (upholding search wlhere on record Sawyer's 
failure to object "had little or no probative value," because bag searched was not of a 
13 
type that on its face, could not reasonably have been believed to belong to the 
consenting driver). Where there was nothing about the bags themselves that 
suggested they did not belong to the driver, the majority correctly recognized that 
the mere presence of passengers was insufficient to require Officer Westerman to 
make further inquiry. See Harding, 2010 UT App 8, f t 12-14. 
It may well be "better law-enforcement practice . . . for police officers 
specifically to inquire and attempt to ascertain ownership of luggage in a vehicle 
with several occupants, rather than rely on the driver's consent to search," but the 
Fourth Amendment does not require it. Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070; cf. Randolph, 
547 U.S. at 122 (officers not "required" "to take affirmative steps to find potentially 
objecting co-tenant before acting on the persmission they had already received"). 
Rather, "the validity of the search .. . depend[s not] on whether the [officer] used 
the best procedure, but rather on whether the officer's conduct was objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances." Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070. As shown, 
where the bags were stowed in an area typically controlled by the owner/driver, 
and there was no indication that they did not, in fact, belong to the driver, the 
circumstances here did not compel Officer Westerman to make further inquiry 
before reasonably relying on the driver's consent to search. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
at 186. While the officer was ultimately mistaken as to the driver's authority to 
14 
consent, it was the mistake "of [a] reasonable m[a]n, acting on facts leading sensibly 
to [his] conclusionf ] of probability/' Id. (case citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Nevertheless, Defendant asserts that the circumstances here are similar to 
those in State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998), and Duran, 2005 UT App 409, 
where the court of appeals faulted officers for failing to further investigate before 
searching. See Pet. Br. at 12-13. But both cases are readily distinguishable. In Davis, 
a probation-search case, officers searched, among other things, a Ford Escort parked 
on property probationer Davis shared with his non-probationer girlfriend and 
codefendant. 965 P.2d at 527, 529. The court of appeals held that officers 
unreasonably believed Davis had common authority over the Escort where (1) they 
had never seen Davis drive it—he had only been seen driving a van also parked on 
the property, and (2) the only indication Davis may haye had any access to the 
Escort were allegedly male footprints in the snow leading up to it, which could have 
also been made by the many officers on the scene. Id. at 533-535. 
In Duran, a common-authority case, officers searched a trailer based on the 
landlord's consent. 2005 UT App 409, I f 13-16. But a landlord may not generally 
grant consent to search leased premises. See Duran, 2001} UT App 409, f 15 (citing 
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)); see also 
4L Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.5(a) (4th ed. 2004) (collecting cases). 
15 
Knowing they had only the landlord's consent, however, officers in Duran acted on 
that consent to search without any "reasonable inquiry into the [landlord's] mutual 
use of the trailer." Duran, 2005 UT App 409,116. 
In sum, the circumstances in both Davis and Duran indicated that a third party 
controlled the premises to be searched. In contrast, other than the passengers' mere 
presence in the SUV, nothing in this case indicated that the bags in the storage area 
belonged to anyone other than the driver. Davis and Duran, therefore, are 
inapposite.5 
Defendant argues that any ambiguity triggers an officer's obligation to make 
further inquiry. See Pet. Br. at 9, 17, 21. But in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court 
expressly recognized that some ambiguity is to be expected in third-party consent 
cases. 497 U.S. at 186 (recognizing officers often confront "more or less ambiguous" 
circumstances and "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part" (case 
citation and quotation marks omitted)). And in Randolph, the Court emphasized 
5
 Defendant asserts that the driver's consent in this case is weaker than the 
landlord's consent in Duran because officers in Duran also had probable cause to 
believe a crime was being committed, whereas Officer Westerman lacked even 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity here. See Pet. Br. at 17-18. Contrary to 
Defendant's assertion, neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion is a 
prerequisite to a valid consent; they are, in fact, irrelevant. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 
106; Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-52; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171; 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. 
16 
that the ambiguity inherent in third-party consent cases does not mean officers must 
always "take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting [third party] before 
acting on the persmission they had already received/' 547 U.S. at 122. Rather, as 
shown, even where passengers are present, it is only when there is evidence 
suggesting an item in fact belongs to someone other than the consenting driver that 
the Fourth Amendment requires additional inquiry. See, e.g., Jams, 86 F.3d at 386, 
389-90; Welch, 4 F.3d at 764; see also James, 645 N.E2d at 203-04; Sawyer, 784 A.2d at 
1212-13; Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070; Souza, 627 A.2d at 1077; Zachodni, 466 N. W.2d 
at 628. Accordingly, because the consenting driver here clearly controlled the SUV, 
and there was no evidence that control did not extend to the bags in the cargo area, 
the majority correctly concluded that Officer Westerman reasonably relied on the 
driver's consent to search the bags. 
Finally, Defendant also relies on State v. Frank, 630 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2002), but that case misconstrues Fourth Amendment law. See Pet. Br. at 16, 
18-20. In Frank, as here, an officer obtained consent to search from the driver, and 
upon opening the trunk found two suitcases inside, which he searched without first 
ascertaining whether they belonged to the driver or to Fr^nk. 650 N.W.2d at 215. In 
holding the search was unreasonable, the Minnesota court created an essentially per 
se rule that "when a vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer has an 
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obligation to ascertain the ownership of items not owned by or within the control of 
the consenter when the circumstances do not clearly indicate that the consenter is 
the owner or controls the items to be searched/' Id. at 219. The Harding majority 
correctly recognized that "Frank's requirement is too sweeping." Harding, 2010 UT 
App 8,117. Where, as here, the driver has consented to a search and the contents of 
the vehicle are "more anonymous," id. at f 18, the reasonableness requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment does not compel officers to "take affirmative steps to find a 
potentially objecting [passenger] before acting on the permission they had already 
received" from the driver. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 
185 (Fourth Amendment does not require that officers "always be correct, but that 
they always be reasonable"). 
In sum, the majority correctly held that Officer Westerman reasonably 
believed that the driver's consent to search the SUV included the bags stowed 
therein, because there was no evidence the bags belonged to anyone other than the 
driver. The bags were stowed in an area typically controlled by the owner/driver, 
there was nothing about the bags7 appearance that suggested they did not belong to 
the driver, and neither the driver nor any passenger volunteered that the bags 
belonged to Defendant rather than the driver. Given the totality of these 
circumstances, the majority correctly held that Officer Westerman reasonably, if 
18 
mistakenly, relied on the driver's consent to search the SUV, including the bags. 
Absent any evidence suggesting the bags did not in fact belong to the driver, the 
Fourth Amendment did not compel Officer Westerman to ascertain whether the 
bags, in fact, belonged to the driver before he could reasonably rely on the driver's 
consent to search them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the majority opinion. 
Respectfully submitted 10 January 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January \Q, 2011, two copies of the foregoing brief were 
E-mailed • hand-delivered to: 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Utah County Public Defender Assoc. 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 







riff ?-i » 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
TINA MARIE HARDING, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
fcase No. 081400645 
J^ idge Claudia Laycock 
June 12,2008 
This matter came before the court for oral arguments on the defendant's Motion to 
Suppress on June 4, 2008. The plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, Craig R. 
Johnson. The defendant appeared in custody of the Utah County Sheriff and was roprosontod by 
Barbara A. Gonzales. Having reviewed the file, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the 
memoranda presented by both parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties, the court issues 
the following: 
I. PROCEDUAL HISTORY 
1. On March 19, 2008, during the preliminary hearing, the couift bound over the defendant 
for trial on 1) illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, 2) possession or use of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 3) false informatipn to a police officer, and 4) 
use or possession of drug paraphernalia. 
2. The defendant filed her Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of her Motion to 
Suppress on April 25, 2008. 
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3. On May 2, 2008, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
4. On May 28, 2008, the court requested additional pleadings addressing State v. Hansen, 63 
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
5. The defense filed her additional memorandum on June 2, 2008 and the State filed its 
additional memorandum on June 3, 2008. 
6. The court heard oral arguments on June 4, 2008 and took the matter under advisement. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for 
an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m. 
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman discovered that the 
driver's license had been denied. 
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could drive the vehicle from 
the scene, Officer Westerman requested the names and dates of birth for each of the 
passengers and discovered that none of the passengers had a valid license. 
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a citation for an 
inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license. 
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the vehicle and told the 
driver that she was free to leave. 
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6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. At that point Officer 
Westerman requested permission to look in the vehicle and fhe driver gave consent. 
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman asked the driver to 
search the vehicle, but was not involved in the search. 
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the defendant's bags. They 
were located in a storage area directly behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a 
passenger in the vehicle. 
9. Before searching the bags, neither Ms. Harding nor any of thp other passengers indicated 
to whom the bags belonged. 
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying Ms. Harding as the owner 
of the bags were found in the bags during the search. 
11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested Ms. Harding and 
during the search incident to arrest, Officer Westerman found a blade knife on Ms. 
Harding's person. 
II. PARTIES' STIPULATIONS 
12. The initial traffic stop was legal. 
13. The defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The parties have stipulated to two important issues that the dourt would normally have to 
determine in a case such as this. First, the defense acknowledged and the court finds that the traffic 
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stop conducted by Officer Westerman was justified at its inception. Second, the State has 
acknowledged and the court finds that Ms. Harding has standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the vehicle search because she had a reasonable expectation to privacy in her bags and she never 
abandoned them. In State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178 (Utah App. 2003), the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress because it determined that the defendant lacked standing. The Bissegger court 
overturned that ruling, concluding that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her 
belongings and that she never abandoned them. Unlike Bissegger, in the case before the Court 
here, standing and abandonment are not disputed. 
But similar to Bissegger, the Court must now determine whether the search of the vehicle 
conducted by Officer Westerman was lawful. To determine this, the Court must ask three 
questions. First, was Officer Westerman's action in stopping the vehicle justified at its inception? 
Second, did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the detention? And third, were Ms. 
Harding's bags within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle? As noted above, both parties 
agree that the answer to the first question is yes: the initial stop was lawful. Thus, the court is left to 
determine whether the search exceeded the scope of the detention and whether Ms. Harding's bags 
were within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle. 
A. DID THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE 
DETENTION? 
In general an officer must have a warrant to search a vehicle, but one of the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement is voluntary consent of the vehicle owner. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1217-18 (Utah 1993). Here, it is undisputed that Officer Westerman obtained the consent of 
the driver before searching the vehicle. However, as seen in both Bissegger and State v. Hansen, 
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63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), a search may be illegal even with consent if the search exceeds the scope 
of the detention. In both of those cases, the consent obtained was not valid because the traffic stop 
had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter. Similarly, Officer Westerman's search of the 
vehicle would be legal only if he had obtained consent after the encpunter had de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter. 
Hansen sets out an excellent roadmap of analysis to determine whether an encounter has 
de-escalated or not. The general rule is that "a traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter 
when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she 
is free to.. .depart." Id at 661. As a threshold matter "a stop may not be consensual unless the 
driver's documents have been returned to him." Id. But, when the facts of a case pass this threshold 
matter (as it did in Hansen and as it does in the case before the court), the court must look to other 
factors to determine whether a traffic stop has de-escalated. As set out in Hansen, "informing a 
person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to answer additional questions" weighs in favor 
of de-escalation. Id. But a "coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one 
officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone 
of voice" weighs against de-escalation. Id at 662. The Hansen court explained that, under the facts 
of that case, a reasonable person would not think the encounter at ispue in the case had 
de-escalated; in fact, a reasonable person could believe that the encounter had escalated. Id First, 
the factual differences between the initial stop and the additional questioning were minimal in that 
the show offeree by the questioning officer had not materially changed. Id. Second, at the time of 
the additional questioning, a second patrol car with its lights on arrived on the scene, which could 
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have made a reasonable person believe the encounter was escalating, not de-escalating. Finally, 
the officer never told the driver he was free to leave and began the additional questioning before 
issuing a citation or addressing the alleged violation. Id. 
Unlike Hansen, the traffic stop in this matter had de-escalated to a consensual encounter 
before Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Before Asking for consent, 
Officer Westerman had returned all the driver's documents and had given her a citation for the 
traffic violations, indicating she was free to leave. A reasonable person would have known she was 
free to leave. The second officer was already present before the driver was asked for her consent to 
search the vehicle, so a reasonable person would not have thought the encounter had escalated, as 
was the case in Hansen. Finally, the driver voluntarily came back to the officer with an additional 
comment or question—initiating further conversation herself. It was during this conversation, not 
before, that Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Unlike Hansen, a 
reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances in this case. The court 
concludes that the stop had de-escalated before consent was given and, therefore, the search of the 
vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention. 
The defense argues that, while the driver may have felt free to leave before consenting to 
search the vehicle, Ms. Harding, as a passenger inside the vehicle during the conversations 
between Officer Westerman and the driver, did not feel free to leave. The court, however, sees no 
need to rule as to whether or not Ms. Harding felt free to leave because the question is irrelevant 
under these circumstances. As explained in Biggegger, "a car passenger does not normally have 
standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory interest in the car." 76 
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P.3d at 181. Nowhere in record is there any indication that Ms. Harding had either a possessory or 
ownership interest in the vehicle—she was just a passenger. It is true that she has standing to 
challenge the search because she owned the bags that Officer Westetman ultimately searched, but 
since Officer Westerman lawfully received consent from the only person in the vehicle who had a 
possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle, the search of the vehicle was lawful. To rule 
otherwise would require an officer to gain consent from every passenger before searching a 
vehicle (because each passenger may have personal belongings in the vehicle) and to individually 
tell each passenger that he or she was free to leave. The case law dods not support that conclusion. 
Thus, regardless of whether Ms. Harding reasonably felt free to leav$ or not, Officer Westerman's 
search was proper because the traffic stop had already de-escalated, Officer Westerman received 
consent from the driver, and, therefore, the search did not exceed the scope of the detention. 
B. WERE MS. HARDING'S BAGS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT TO 
SEARCH THE VEHICLE? 
It is undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags 
because she never abandoned them. However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy becomes irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal. 
The court directs the parties' attention to Florida v Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). In Jimeno, an 
officer gained consent to search a vehicle in which the driver and hi$ wife were occupants. Id at 
249-50. After the passenger stepped out of the vehicle, the officer found a brown paper bag on the 
passenger floorboard with cocaine inside. Id at 250. The United States Supreme Court overturned 
the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that a general consent to search a vehicle did not extent to a 
closed bag on the floorboard. Id. The Supreme Court explained, "[IJijfthe driver's] consent would 
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reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no 
grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization." Id at 252. It further explained, "We think that 
it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search 
respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs." Id 
at 251. Clearly, then, the standard for determining whether Officer Westerman's search of the bags 
was within the scope of the consent is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to 
conclude that the bags were part of the consent given. The court concludes that it was. 
There is no indication in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or 
attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given those circumstances, 
Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the 
contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme Court explained in Jimeno, it is objectionably reasonable 
for an officer to search a container "which might bear drugs." Id. Bags in a vehicle could certainly 
contain drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively reasonable. 
Thus, Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent given to search the vehicle. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, Officer Westerman's action was justified in its inception, the search 
did not exceed the scope of the detention, and Ms. Harding's bags were within the scope of the 
consent given to search the vehicle. Therefore, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress. 
The State shall prepare the appropriate findings, conclusions, and order and submit them for the 
court's signature. 
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DATED this (2JUday of June, 2008. --0 V"» 
Fourth District .Court Judge 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tina HARDING. Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20080772-CA. 
Jan 22,2010. 
Rehearing Denied Feb 8, 2010. 
Background: Defendant was convicted pursuant to 
conditional guilty pleas in the Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, Claudia Laycock, J., of illegal 
possession or use of a controlled substance and pos-
session of a dangerous weapon by a restricted per-
son. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., 
held that: 
(1) encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer 
de-escalated from investigatory detention to con-
sensual encounter, and 
(2) search of defendant's bags was based on a reas-
onable belief that they belonged to dnver of vehicle 
and that driver had authority to consent to their 
search. 
Affirmed. 
Thome, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
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48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or 
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases 
A passenger of a car is seized when a traffic stop 
occurs and so may challenge the constitutionality of 
the stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or 
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases 
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for the duration of a traffic stop. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
[6] Automobiles 48A €=>349(2.1) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVI1 Offenses • 
48AVH(B) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
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48Ak349(2) Grounds 
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Generally speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic viola-
tion observed by an officer is justified. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Once the purpose of the initial traffic stop is con-
cluded, the person must be allowed to depart. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
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48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or 
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48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
A traffic stop that begins as a seizure may de-
escalate to a mere consensual encounter. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Any investigatory traffic stop may properly be de-
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counter when a reasonable person would believe, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or 
she is free to end the encounter and depart. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
An encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be 
deemed to have de-escalated into consensual en-
counter, for Fourth Amendment purposes, unless 
the driver's documents have been returned to her. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
In determining whether encounter initiated by a 
traffic stop has de-escalated into consensual en-
counter, a court, if the driver's documents have 
been returned, considers factors tending to show 
de-escalation, including informing a person she is 
free to leave, or that she does not have to answer 
additional questions. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak34^ Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
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48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
In determining whether encounter initiated by a 
traffic stop has de-escalated into consensual en-
counter, factors that weigh against de-escalation in-
clude failure to issue a warning or citation before 
engaging in additional questioning and a coercive 
show of authority, such as the presence of more 
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical 
touching by the officer, or the officer's use of a 
commanding tone of voice indicating that compli-
ance might be compelled. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
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48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak|549(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(18) k. Inquiry; license, 
registration, or waitrant checks. Most Cited Cases 
Encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer, who 
initiated traffic stop for equipment violation, de-
escalated from investigatory detention to consensu-
al encounter, before officer asked driver if he could 
look in her vehicle; driver's documents had been re-
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turned to her and she was cited for violations, there 
was distinct break in encounter when officer told 
driver she was free to leave, officers' vehicles' 
emergency lights were off, and there was no indica-
tion that officers' weapons were displayed, that of-
ficers touched driver or passengers, or that officer 
used commanding tone of voice, as would suggest 
coercion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[14] Searches and Seizures 349 C::=>186 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349k 186 k. Scope and duration of consent; 
withdrawal. Most Cited Cases 
Search of bags of defendant, who was passenger in 
vehicle stopped for traffic violations, was based on 
a reasonable belief that they belonged to driver and 
that driver had authority to consent to their search; 
officer, during search of vehicle, found two bags 
and various loose items in cargo space behind back 
seat of vehicle, there was nothing on or about bags 
to indicate they belonged to anyone other than 
driver, none of the vehicle's occupants stated that 
bags belonged to anyone other than driver, and no 
one objected to search. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
[15] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 1 8 6 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl 86 k. Scope and duration of consent; 
withdrawal. Most Cited Cases 
If a person consents to a general search of their 
property, within which is contained property owned 
by another person, the consent is valid so long as 
the consenting party has authority over the area or 
has a sufficient relationship to the premises or ef-
fects sought to be inspected. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
*1149 Margaret Lindsay, Spanish Fork, for Appel-
lant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Marian Decker, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and GREEN-
WOOD.™1 
FN1. Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela 
T. Greenwood heard and voted on this case 
as regular members of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. They both retired from the court 
on January 1, 2010, before this decision is-
sued. Hence, they are designated herein as 
Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. § 




T[ 1 Defendant Tina Harding appeals her convictions 
for illegal possession or use of a controlled sub-
stance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. These charges stem from the 
search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a pas-
senger. Specifically, she appeals the trial court's 
denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained 
during the search, arguing that the search of her 
bags, which were inside the rear storage compart-
ment of the vehicle, was *1150 a violation of her 
Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
T( 2 Defendant was a passenger in her friend's 
vehicle when Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a 
traffic stop for an equipment violation because the 
vehicle's plate lamp was inoperable. Officer West-
erman ran a routine check on the driver and learned 
that she did not have a valid driver license. He then 
requested the names and birth dates of each of the 
three passengers and discovered that none of them 
had a valid driver license.™2 Officer Westerman 
asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a 
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and driving 
without a license. He then told her she was free to 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
223 P.3d 1148, 648 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 2010 UT App 8 
(Cite as: 223 P.3d 1148) 
Page 5 
leave, but advised her to contact someone to come 
drive the vehicle because none of the passengers 
had a valid driver license. The driver began to walk 
toward her vehicle but returned to ask Officer 
Westerman a question. At that point, Officer West-
erman asked her if he could look in the vehicle and 
she consented. Officer Westerman asked the pas-
sengers to exit the vehicle and told them they could 
wait with the backup officer "if they wanted." This 
second officer arrived before Officer Wresterman 
completed his investigation and prior to the driver 
consenting to a search. The emergency lights on 
both of the officers' vehicles were off before the 
driver exited her vehicle. 
FN2. Defendant initially gave a false name 
to Officer WTesterman. 
|^ 3 During Officer Westerman's search of the 
vehicle he found a brown bag and a blue bag FN3 
in the cargo space behind the back seat of the 
vehicle. Before searching the bags, Officer Wester-
man did not ask to whom they belonged, and none 
of the passengers claimed ownership of them. There 
were no visible indications on the bags that they be-
longed to anyone other than the driver. The bags 
contained drugs and drug paraphernalia and other 
items indicating the bags belonged to Defendant. 
Officer Westerman then searched Defendant and 
found a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade. 
Officer Westerman arrested Defendant and gave her 
Miranda warnings. 
FN3. Although Defendant describes the 
bags as backpacks in her briefs, Officer 
Westerman testified that they were bags. 
He was the only witness who testified. 
U 4 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but 
the trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered 
conditional guilty pleas, see State v. Scry, 758 P.2d 
935, 938-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (discussing and 
expressly authorizing guilty pleas conditioned upon 
the ability to appeal the denial of a motion to sup-
press evidence), and now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] H 5 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
denying her motion to suppress evidence because 
the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal 
search and seizure. We afford little discretion to the 
district court's determination in cases involving the 
legality of a search and seizure "because there must 
be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement 
and prosecutorial officials." State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, «([ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Initial Detention De-escalated to a Consensu-
al Encounter 
[2][3][4][5][6] H 6 Unreasonable searches are pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
This protection extends to automobile stops, al-
though reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the 
"purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting de-
tention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 
When a traffic stop occurs, "the driver of the car is 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment .... [and] a passenger is seized as well and so 
may challenge the constitutionality of the stop." 
Brendhn v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 
S.Ct. 2400, 168 t-Ed.2d 132 (2007). That seizure 
continues "[fjor the duration of a traffic stop." Ari-
zona v. Johnson, — U.S. — , — , 129 S.Ct. 781, 
782, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Generally* 1151 
speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic violation ob-
served by an officer is justified. See Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, K 30, 63 P.3d*650. Recognizing this prin-
ciple, the parties in this case stipulated that the ini-
tial traffic stop w^s a legally valid investigatory de-
tention. 
[7][8][9] U 7 "Onde the purpose of the initial stop is 
concluded ... the person must be allowed to depart." 
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Id ^ 31 Further, "[a] traffic stop that begins as a 
seizuie may de-escalate to a mere consensual en-
counter" Id 1^ 33 Thus, we consider whether the 
vehicle occupants' encounter with Officer Wester-
man had de-escalated from an investigatory deten-
tion to a consensual encounter before Officer West-
erman asked the driver if he could look m her 
vehicle Any investigatory traffic stop may properly 
be determined to have "de-escalate[d] to a consen-
sual encounter when a reasonable person would be-
lieve, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that he or she is free to end the encounter and de-
part " / J ^ 39 
[10][11][12] H 8 In State v Hansen 2002 UT 125, 
63 P 3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court addressed de-
escalations to consensual encounters By definition, 
" 'an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not 
be deemed consensual unless the dnvei's docu-
ments have been returned to [hei] ' " Id \ 40 
(quoting United States v Gregon, 79 F 3d 973, 
979 (10th Cirl996)) If the driver's documents 
have been returned, we consider "factors tending to 
show de-escalation," including "informing a person 
[s]he is free to leave, or that [s]he does not have to 
answer additional questions" Id ^ 41 By contrast, 
factors that weigh against de-escalation include 
"failure to issue a warning or citation before enga-
ging m additional questioning" and "a coercive 
show of authority, such as the presence of more 
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical 
touchmg by the officer, or [the officer's] use of a 
commanding tone of voice indicating that compli-
ance might be compelled" Id (internal quotation 
marks omitted) 
U 9 In Hansen the supreme court reversed this 
court's decision that a traffic stop had de-escalated 
to a consensual encounter, determining that there 
was no noticeable break between the initial traffic 
stop and the further questioning unrelated to the 
purpose for the traffic stop See id ^ 6^ In addi-
tion, the officer did not address the traffic viola-
tions before questioning the defendant about pos-
sible contraband and did not tell the defendant he 
was free to leave See id ^ 45 Because the supreme 
court "questionfed] whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to leave befoie being issued a warn-
ing or citation, or at least being told he or she could 
leave," id, it concluded that the "detention had not 
de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time 
of the additional questioning, and thus, [the defend-
ant] was illegally seized," id ^ 46 
[13] *| 10 In this case, howe\er, the driver's docu-
ments had been returned to her and she was cited 
for the equipment violation and lack of a driver li-
cense Further, there was a distinct break in the en-
counter when Officer Westerman told the driver she 
was free to leave At that point, the purpose of the 
traffic stop had clearly been concluded However, 
the driver then approached Officer Westerman to 
ask a question While it is true that there was a 
backup officer present, the facts do not suggest co-
ercion For example, the officers' vehicles' emer-
gency lights were off, and there is no indication that 
the officers' weapons were displayed, that the of-
ficers touched the driver or the passengers, or that 
the officer used a commanding tone of voice See 
id \ 41 (listing these criteria as examples of beha-
vior that would indicate coercion) 
If 11 We conclude that, under these circumstances, 
the driver would have reasonably felt free to leave 
and, therefore, the encounter had de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter See id ffl[ 33-34 Thereafter, 
the driver consented to a search of the vehicle Al-
though Defendant lacked standing to object to the 
search because she did not own or exercise author-
ity over the vehicle, the State stipulated that she 
had standing to challenge the search of her bags be-
cause she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the bags and did not abandon them Thus, we turn 
to the legality of the search of Defendant's *1152 
bags™ ~ 
FN4 Defendant's primary argument per-
taining to the legality of the search is that 
there was no de-escalation from the seizure 
resulting from the traffic stop We have de-
termined that de-escalation did occur prior 
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to the driver consenting to the search and 
that Defendant lacks standing to object to 
the consent to search the vehicle. However, 
Defendant also argued to the trial court, 
and briefly on appeal, that the seizure of 
the passengers continued during the 
vehicle search because the passengers 
could not have reasonably believed they 
were free to leave. The trial court rejected 
this argument as irrelevant because De-
fendant could not object to the vehicle 
search because she did not own the 
vehicle. Defendant cites no authority ad-
dressing whether, when the traffic stop is 
over from the driver's standpoint, it is also 
over for any passengers. Furthermore, De-
fendant does not address how, if at all, de-
escalation as to the driver from a valid 
traffic stop to a consensual encounter af-
fects her status as a passenger. In this re-
spect, Defendant's brief is inadequate. See 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 
(Utah 1998) (noting that generally we will 
not address an inadequately briefed argu-
ment). 
Our analysis assumes that, as is the case 
here, nothing happened to raise any sus-
picions about the vehicle's passengers. 
The only facts of record that would in-
dicate a continued detention of the pas-
sengers is Officer Westerman's request 
that they exit the vehicle and suggestion 
that they stand by the second officer 
while Officer Westerman conducted the 
search. Nothing occurred that would 
cause Officer Westerman to suspect De-
fendant or the other passengers of illegal 
activity or to believe that they had a 
basis to object to a search of the vehicle 
or its contents. Given these circum-
stances and the lack of adequate briefing 
by Defendant, we decline to further ad-
dress this possible issue. See id. 
Paee7 
II. The Search of Defendant's Bags Was Legal 
[14] U 12 Our analysis of the legality of the search 
of Defendant's bags begins with the question of 
whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to 
conclude that the driver's consent extended to De-
fendant's personal belongings. As noted above, the 
State concedes that Defendant has standing to chal-
lenge whether the officer had a reasonable belief 
that the driver's consent to search the vehicle exten-
ded to Defendant's bags. 
[15] t 13 In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 
S.Ct 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under 
the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective* reason-
ableness-what would the typical reasonable person 
have understood by the exchange between the of-
ficer and the suspect?" Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801 
(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89, 
110 S.Ct. 2793, | l l l L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). In Ji-
meno, the car driver consented to a search and the 
officer searched a folded, brown paper bag located 
on the floor of the car, discovering cocaine in the 
bag. See id. The Court examined whether the con-
sent extended to tjhe paper bag and concluded "that 
it was objectively reasonable for the police to con-
clude that the general consent to search [the] car in-
cluded consent to search containers within that car 
which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may 
be expected to kriow that narcotics are generally 
carried in some fbrm of a container." Id. Further-
more, if a person consents to a general search of 
their property, within which is contained property 
owned by another person, the consent is valid so 
long as the consenting party has authority over the 
area or has a "sufficient relationship to the premises 
or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Messer, 
2007 UT App 166, % 21, 164 P.3d 421. 
U 14 The critical inquiry then is whether the police 
officer reasonably believed that the consenting 
party has sufficient authority to consent to the 
search. In State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, 164 
P.3d 421, the police searched a car located on a 
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third party's property with the property owner's 
consent and discovered contraband in bags in the 
car's trunk belonging to the defendant. See id. \ 4. 
This court noted that common authority over prop-
erty was not necessarily dependent on ownership, 
but could also be established by possession. See id. 
% 22. The search and seizure were upheld 
"[bjecause the officers could have, at the very least, 
reasonably believed that [the property owner] had 
authority to consent to a search of the car trunk and 
its contents." Id. ^ 23. 
f 15 The State cites cases holding that a driver's 
consent to a vehicle search extends to the property 
of a third person in the vehicle when the property 
does not clearly belong to a person other than the 
driver. *1153 See United States v. Hammons, 152 
F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir.1998) (noting that the de-
fendant's garment bag was properly searched where 
the defendant's wife consented to the vehicle search 
and the officers did not see identifying tags on the 
bag, reasonably believing that the bag belonged to 
the defendant's wife); State v. Sawver, 147 N.H. 
191, 784 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (200i) (holding of-
ficers reasonably believed driver had authority to 
consent to search of bag belonging to defendant); 
State v. Maristany, 133 NJ. 299, 627 A.2d 1066, 
1070 (1993) (stating officers had reasonable belief 
driver had authority to consent to search of luggage 
in vehicle trunk where there were no indications 
luggage belonged to passengers). The State further 
contends that because the ultimate test of a search's 
legality is objective reasonableness, police officers 
are not required to seek permission to open each 
closed container during a consensual vehicle 
search, because consent to search a vehicle "is 
equivalent to general consent to search the vehicle 
and its contents, including containers such as lug-
gage," United States v. Grain, 33 F.3d 480, 484 
(5th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Rich, 992 
F.2d502, 508 (5th Cir.1993)). 
f^ 16 Defendant disagrees with the State's applica-
tion of this case law and argues that the driver's 
consent in this case did not extend to Defendant's 
bags located in the rear of the car. In support of that 
argument Defendant urges us to adopt the rule ap-
plied in State v. Frank 650 N.W.2d 213 
(Minn.Ct.App.2002). There, a vehicle was stopped 
for having only one working headlight. See id. at 
215. After citing the driver for the equipment viola-
tion, the officer became suspicious of drug activity, 
separated the individuals in the car, and asked the 
driver for and received permission to search the 
vehicle. See id. The officer opened the trunk of the 
vehicle and found two suitcases. See id. The officer 
did not ask who owned the suitcases and did not 
ask permission from the passengers to search the 
suitcases. See id. The officer found drugs and later 
learned that the suitcase belonged to the defendant, 
a passenger in the vehicle. See id. The Minnesota 
court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and 
"conclude[d] that the cases holding that a driver's 
consent to search a motor vehicle does not extend 
to property owned by passengers who are present 
and available to consent to the search of their prop-
erty are more consistent with constitutional limits 
on warrantless searches than the cases that conclude 
otherwise." Id. at 218-219. The Minnesota court 
held that, "when a vehicle search is based only on 
consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the 
ownership of items not owned by or within the con-
trol of the consenter when the circumstances do not 
clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or 
controls the items to be searched." Id. at 219. 
T[ 17 Here, Defendant argues that a reasonable per-
son in Officer Westerman's position would reason-
ably believe that the bags belonged to one of the 
three passengers rather than to the driver. The pres-
ence of the three passengers and the location of the 
bags in the small storage space behind the rear pas-
senger seat would lead to that reasonable belief. 
Under these circumstances, Defendant asserts, Of-
ficer Westerman should have inquired about the 
bags' ownership and sought consent to search from 
anyone who asserted ownership. Defendant con-
tends that without having done so, Officer Wester-
man's search of the bags was illegal. We do not 
agree, and we believe that Frank's requirement is 
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too sweeping. 
K 18 As acknowledged in Frank, in determining 
what justifies a legal search, "[e]ach case depends 
on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the 
officer to hold in a particular situation." Id. at 217 
(citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 
S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)). If items in a 
vehicle clearly do not belong to a consenting driver 
and there are passengers who may likely own the 
items, the driver's consent to search would not reas-
onably extend to those items. Examples might in-
clude an item with a label or tag indicating owner-
ship, or a purse, when there is a male driver and a 
female passenger. See United States v. Welch, 4 
F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that under the 
circumstances it was not reasonable for officers to 
believe male driver had authority to consent to 
search of his passenger/girlfriend's purse). Other 
situations where the vehicle's contents are more 
*1154 anonymous would likely lead to an object-
ively reasonable belief that the consenting driver 
owned and/or exercised control over the vehicle 
and items contained therein. 
[^ 19 The particulars of the situation in this case 
lead us to conclude that the search of Defendant's 
bags was based on a reasonable belief that they be-
longed to the driver and that the driver had author-
ity to consent to their search. These particulars in-
clude the following, taken from the brief testimony 
of Officer Westerman, the only witness called to 
testify: (1) there was a small storage area in the rear 
of the car behind the backseat; (2) items in this 
storage area included a brown bag and a dark blue 
bag, and various loose items; (3) there was nothing 
on or about the bags to indicate they belonged to 
anyone other than the driver; (4) the vehicle's occu-
pants consisted of the driver and three passengers; 
(5) neither the driver nor any of the passengers in-
formed Officer Westerman about where they had 
been or where they were going; (6) none of the 
vehicle's occupants stated that the bags belonged to 
anyone other than the driver; and (7) no one objec-
ted to the search. Under these circumstances it was 
objectively reasonable for Officer Westerman to 
believe the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief 
that the bags belonged to one of the passengers 
would necessarily be based on speculation. On the 
other hand, it is patently reasonable to believe that 
a car owner would toss or place bags or other items 
in a small storage area of a car, located behind the 
passenger seat. We therefore conclude that under 
these circumstances, search of Defendant's bags 
was lawful. 
H 20 Affirmed. 
U 21 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Senior 
Judge. 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
U 22 I respectfully dissent from the majority opin-
ion, as I cannot agree with its conclusion that the 
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's 
consent was permissible. Here, the trial court ex-
pressly found that, under the circumstances, Officer 
Westerman "had no way of knowing whose bags 
they were." Accordingly, I disagree that Officer 
WTesterman can be said to have had a reasonable b e -
lief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, and I 
would hold that the State failed to meet its burden 
of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent 
authority to consent to the search of Defendant's 
bags. 
U 23 Both the trial court and, to a lesser extent, the 
majority opinion treat this as a case about the scope 
of the driver's consent. It is not. There is no dispute 
that, had the bags belonged to the driver, permis-
sion to search the bags would have been included 
within the scope of her consent to search the car. 
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 
1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ("We think that it 
was objectively reasonable for the police to con-
clude that the general consent to search respond-
ents' car included consent to search containers with-
in that car which might bear drugs."). Rather, the 
question presented in this case involves the driver's 
authority to consent to the search of the bags. 
\ 24 " Tf a third party rather than the defendant 
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consents to a search, the third party must be one 
who possesses "common authority" over the area or 
has some other "sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected" ' " 
State v Messer, 2007 UT App 166, ^ 21, 164 P 3d 
421 (quoting State v Brown, 853 P 2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992)) "Moreover, a search is valid even in 
instances where the third party does not possess 
common authority, as long as the police 
'reasonably beheve[ ] ' " that the third party pos-
sesses such authority Id (alteration m original) 
(quoting Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 189, 
110 SCt 2^93, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990)) However, 
the State bears the burden of establishing that one 
who consents to a search has the authority to do so 
See Bioxxn 853 P 2d at 855 ("The State bears the 
burden of proving common authority, and it must 
do so by a preponderance of the evidence "), see 
aho State x Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 23, 164 P 3d 
397 ("When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden 
of proving the reasonableness of the officer's ac-
tions during an investigative detention ") 
% 25 It is undisputed in this case that the driver did 
not have actual authority to consent*1155 to the 
search of Defendant's bagsFN^ Thus, m order for 
the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate 
that the facts known to Officer Westerman would 
nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable 
caution to conclude that the driver had such author-
ity Cf State v Dm an 2005 UT App 409, \ 14, 131 
P 3d 246 ("If the facts known to the officers would 
not cause a person of reasonable caution to con-
clude that the consenting party had authority over 
the premises, 'then warrantless entry without fur-
ther inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually 
exists' " (quoting Rodriguez 497 U S at 188-89, 
110 S Ct 2793)) It appears that the only indicia of 
ownership or control of the bags was their mere 
presence m the driver's vehicle, along with multiple 
passengers and m an area accessible to those pas-
sengers As the trial court aptly found, this informa-
tion alone gave Officer Westerman 'no way of 
knowing whose bags they were " 
FN5 The trial court found that Defendant 
had not abandoned her bags and retained a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in them. 
Further, this is not a case where Defendant 
left her bags m the care of a third person 
and thereby took the risk that the third per-
son might not respect her privacy See, 
eg, State ^ Messer, 2007 UT \pp 166, ]\ 
22, 164 P 3d 421 ("[I]n leaving the bags in 
Hasch's car on Hasch's property, 
[defendant took the risk that Hasch might 
not maintain [defendant's privacy interest 
m the bags"), see also United States \ 
Austin, 66 F3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cn 1995) 
("By leaving his bag m the possession and 
control of [a third party], defendant as-
sumed the risk that [the third party] would 
allow the authorities access to the bag "). 
K 26 At best, Officer WTesterman was presented 
with a situation where ownership and control of the 
bags was ambiguous Utah law requires further in-
quiry before a consent search can be deemed valid 
in such ambiguous situations See id ^ 17 ("The of-
ficers were faced with an ambiguous situation con-
cerning the trailer Although it was owned by 
Mother, it was rented to Horvath Despite that am-
biguity, the officers made no further inquiry and 
proceeded with the warrantless [consent] search 
The search was not lawful " (footnote omitted)), 
State v Dans, 965 P 2d 525, 533 (Utah 
Ct App P98) (stating that the State's burden to 
prove common authority cannot be met " 'if agents, 
faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless 
proceed without making further inquiry' " (quoting 
Lmted States I Whitfield, 939 F 2d 1071, 1075 
(DCCirl991))) 
[^ 27 Had Officer Westerman made further inquiry, 
he could likely have easily ascertained that the bags 
belonged to Defendant and sought her consent to 
search them If further inquiry had resulted m the 
passengers, including Defendant, denying owner-
ship of the bags, then Officer Westerman would 
have had some reason to believe that the bags be-
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ership of the bags, then perhaps an abandonment 
analysis would have been appropriate See gener- END OF DOCUMENT 
ally State \ Rxnhart 2005 UT 84, H 21. 125 P 3d 
938 (discussing abandonment), see also United 
States v Veatuh, 674 F 2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th 
Or 1981) (finding abandonment where the defend-
ant disclaimed ownership of a wallet found on the 
seat of a vehicle) Here, however, Officer Wester-
man made no inquiry whatsoever and, thus, his 
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's 
consent cannot be deemed objectively reasonable 
under Utah case law governing consent searches 
U 28 Because I would suppress the results of the 
search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah case 
law, I see no need to rely on Defendant's primary 
source of authority, State -\ Frank 650 N W 2d 213 
(Minn Ct App 2002) Howe\ er, I agree with the lo-
gic and analysis of Frank and note that its common-
sense holding is itself merely another way of stating 
Utah's law that a consent search based on apparent 
authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of 
ownership or control See id at 219 ("[W]hen a 
vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer 
has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of 
items not owned by or within the control of the 
consenter when the circumstances do not clearly in-
dicate that the consenter is the owner or controls 
the item to be searched ") 
% 29 When Officer Westerman searched Defend-
ant's bags pursuant to the dmers consent, he had 
"no way of knowing whose bags they were " Faced 
with this ambiguity as to whose bags they weie, Of-
ficer WestermanV1156 search, without further in-
quiry, is objectively unreasonable and, therefore, 
unlawful See Dwan 2005 UT App 409, «[  17. 131 
P 3d 246, Davis 965 P 2d at 533 For these reas-
ons, I would suppiess the results of the search and 
reverse Defendant's resulting comictions, and I re-
spectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
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Addendum C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH FILED 
..j^mf^^r APPEUATE COURTS JUL 2 7 2010 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
JUL 2 7 2010 
TAPPEALT 
v, Case No. 20100291-SC 
Tina Harding, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on April 9, 2010. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue. 
Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals 
erred in its analysis and/or application of the Fourth Amendment 
standards governing the apparent authority of a person to consent 
to a search of another person's property. 
A briefing schedule will be established ,hereafter. 
For The Court: 
Dated I'U-d 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
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